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In the standard Barro-type endogenous growth models (see Barro (1990)) fiscal policy can
affect the long run output growth rate. In particular, productive government expenditures and
distortionary taxes induce permanent long run growth effects. Following the eruption of the
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on economic growth
has received renewed interest since most countries have sought to implement fiscal policies
that would allow them to enhance long term growth while maintaining the sustainability of
their public finances .
The aim of this paper is to reassess the predictions of the standard Barro-type endogenous
growth models drawing on recent developments in the panel time series literature. We adopt
the common factor model approach and estimate the effects of fiscal policy for a panel of
EU countries using annual data from 1995 to 2017. In particular, we employ the Common
Correlated Effects (CCE) estimator developed in Pesaran (2006). To our knowledge, this
methodology has not been previously applied to test the predictions of the endogenous growth
models.1
Regarding our sample, we focus on EU countries as they exhibit a number of interesting
characteristics. Specifically, in terms of policy, EU countries are allowed to follow independent
national fiscal policies; however, they are subject to common fiscal rules/targets which impose
constraints on the policy mix adopted by each country. Moreover, due to their participation
in the Union, these countries exhibit increased interdependencies stemming from various
economic, political and social reasons. Lastly, they have been subject to large shocks, such
as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 which, as a result of institutional and local factors, have
heterogeneous impacts across countries. The potential effects of such interdependencies,
which are particularly salient in our panel, have not been accounted for in the relevant
literature. As Kapetanios et al. (2011) show, the presence of such dependencies across
countries could lead to misleading and possibly inconsistent inference.
In testing whether the predictions of the endogenous growth models are supported by
the data, two important challenges have been identified in the related literature. Namely,
the potential endogeneity between fiscal variables and output growth and the appropriate
specification of the government budget constraint. The endogeneity concerns have been
addressed mainly using IV methods and/or GMM estimators (see, for example, Kneller et al.
(1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001)). However, Pesaran and Smith (1995) and more recently
Eberhardt and Teal (2019) show that in the presence of cross-sectional dependence this
identification strategy may be invalid. Regarding the government budget constraint, the
implied linear relationship between the fiscal variables may result in significant biases unless
the implicit financing of changes in some of the instruments is accounted for (see Kneller
et al. (1999) and Gemmell et al. (2011)).
To address these issues we adopt the CCE model, i.e. a methodological approach that
1For an overview of the literature see Table A1 in the Appendix.
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allows us to incorporate into our analysis the heterogeneous impact of common shocks as
well as of local spillover effects both of which induce cross-sectional dependence in the panel.
Additionally, it can account for the underlying time series properties of the data (see Chudik
et al. (2011)). These issues have largely been neglected in the relevant literature. In this
paper, we implement the Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator of Pesaran (2006),
which has been shown to outperform alternative estimators for samples with size similar to
ours.
To illustrate the merits of our generalized estimation approach, which encompasses al-
ternative models that have been extensively used in the literature (namely the Pooled OLS,
the two-way Fixed Effects and the First Difference models), we compare and contrast the
parameter estimates obtained from estimators that do not account for non-stationarity and
cross-sectional dependence and those which can accommodate them. Then, based on residual
diagnostic tests we can gain valuable insights regarding the presence of potential misspecifi-
cation in the rival empirical models.
Our main results are: first, the estimates from the CCE model provide strong support to
the predictions of the standard endogenous growth model. That is fiscal policy exerts long
run effects on growth. More importantly, the CCE estimation generates significantly larger
effects of fiscal policy on growth with respect to the other widely used estimation methods.
Our comparative analysis indicates that estimation methods which ignore the heterogeneous
impact of unobserved common factors across countries (i.e. POLS, FE and FD) could lead to
significant underestimation of the fiscal policy effects on growth. Second, the effects of the
various fiscal variables on growth are robustly identified. In particular, increases in productive
government expenditures enhance growth while increases in distortionary taxation are harmful
for growth. The relatively larger negative effects from increases in distortionary taxation
eventually lead to negative net effect of fiscal policy on long run growth. Finally, these
results are robust to a number of changes in the empirical specification and the sample: the
inclusion of additional control variables such as trade openness, the exclusion from the sample
of outliers like the Periphery countries and the use of alternative fiscal policy instruments,
such as proxies of the fiscal mix and Effective Tax Rates. The latter analysis indicates that
shifts away from labour and capital income taxation toward consumption taxes have positive
effects on growth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the estimation ap-
proach. Section 3 discusses our data and presents the main empirical results, while section 4
presents the results of our robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides





Most of the empirical studies that assess the impact of fiscal policy changes in the context




′Fit + uit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T (1)
where yit denotes the growth rate of GDP per capita in country i in period t, xit is a vector
of conditioning variables which usually includes labour force growth and the investment rate
among others, Fit is a vector of fiscal policy variables (e.g. productive and unproductive
expenditures, distortionary and non-distortionary taxation and budget deficits/surpluses). In
these studies, the error term uit is assumed to have the following form:
uit = αi + λt + εit (2)
where αi are country-specific fixed effects, which capture time-invariant heterogeneity, λt
are the time effects and εit is a standard error term. In this benchmark form equation (1) is
the standard two-way Fixed Effects model, where, the time-varying factors, λt, are assumed
to have a uniform impact across all countries.
In this paper we depart from this literature by employing the Common Correlated Effects
(CCE) methodology developed in Pesaran (2006). This approach allows us to model explicitly
the heterogeneous impact of unobserved macroeconomic shocks. In the CEE specification the
error term, uit, is modeled as having a multifactor structure that consists of the country fixed-
effect, αi and a vector of time-varying unobserved common factors, ft. The heterogeneous
impact of these factors is captured by the vector of country-specific ‘factor loadings’, λ′i.
Thus, the CCE empirical model takes the following augmented form:
yit = β
′xit + γ
′Fit + uit (3)
uit = αi + λ
′
ift + εit (4)
ft = ρ
′ft−1 + εit (5)
xit = δ
′
1igt + %1ift + v1,it (6)
Fit = δ
′
2igt + %2ift + v2,it (7)
The multifactor structure of the error term depicted in equation (4) induces cross-
sectional dependence in the panel due to the presence of the ft factors. Equation (5)
captures the potential persistence over time of the factors while allows for the possibility
that the factors are non-stationary (when ρ = 1). In this case the observables became non-
stationary as well. The unobserved factors should not be viewed as merely being omitted
variables but, rather, as latent factors which impact macroeconomic performance. This is
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made evident by equations (6) and (7), where both the xit and Fit vectors are allowed
to be driven by two sets of unobserved common factors, namely ft and gt.
2 This setup
introduces the possibility of endogeneity, given that the variation in growth rates, fiscal and
control variables is driven by the same (sub)set of unobserved factors. We discuss this issue













where fst is a set of ‘strong’ factors that represent large global shocks which affect all the
countries in the sample (e.g. the Global Financial Crisis), while fwt denotes ‘weak’ factors
which represent localized effects that affect a subset of countries (e.g. spillovers) - see Chudik
et al. (2011) and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015).
2.2 Model Estimation
Subsituting equation (4) into equation (3) yields the following generalized specification:




ift + εit ⇒








ift + εit (9)
Equation (9) nests different empirical models; here, we focus on the Common Correlated
Effects approach developed in Pesaran (2006) and, in particular, we employ the Common
Correlated Effects Pooled estimator (henceforth CCEP) which -to our knowledge- has not
been previously used in the empirical assessment of fiscal policy effects on growth.3 For
comparison purposes, we also estimate equation (9) using the Pooled OLS (POLS), two way
Fixed Effects (FE) and First Difference (FD) estimators. Equation (9) reduces to the FE
and FD models when λ′ift is replaced by time fixed effects (and, in the FD case, by taking
first differences), while the more restrictive POLS model is obtained when we additionally
impose αi = α,∀i.
The basic intuition behind the CCE estimation approach is that since the unobserved
factors are common to all countries, they can be proxied using the information provided
by the observables of the panel. In particular, Pesaran (2006) shows that by augmenting
the empirical model with cross-sectional averages of both the dependent and independent
variables, the impact of the unobserved common factors is asymptotically eliminated. Thus,
2Eberhardt and Teal (2019) conduct a similar analysis, though, in the context of estimating production
functions.
3Pesaran (2006) also developed a Mean Group version of the estimator, which is based on estimating
country-specific regressions and then averaging the estimated coefficients across countries to obtain the panel
estimates, in the spirit of Pesaran and Smith (1995). However, the time dimension of our sample precludes
us from using this estimator.
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the CCEP model takes the following form:

























where ȳt, x̄jt, F̄jt are the cross-sectional means of the covariates and Dj are country dummies.
By interacting the country dummies with the cross-sectional means, each country has its own
unique coefficient on the means, thus capturing the heterogeneous impact of the unobserved
common factors. From equation (10) it is evident that the CCEP estimator is in essence the
FE estimator augmented with additional terms that filter out the impact of the unobserved
common factors.4 Pesaran (2006) shows that the CCEP estimator has good small sample
properties and seems to outperform the CCEMG in samples whose dimensions is similar
to ours. Moreover, Kapetanios et al. (2011) and Chudik et al. (2011) have shown that
they can accommodate the potential non-stationarity of the unobservables -and, hence, the
observables- and the endogeneity induced by the presence of the unobserved common factors,
while also being remarkably robust to structural breaks.
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
One important aspect of the estimation procedure and the interpretation of the results is
the appropriate specification of the within period government budget constraint. Since this
issue has been extensively analyzed in Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001) here
we only provide a brief outline. The government budget constraint is a ‘closed’ system,
i.e. an accounting identity which implies that any change in one of its elements must be
compensated by a change that is equal and of opposite sign in some other element(s) so
that the identity holds. In equation (9) the vector Fit contains all the fiscal instruments
available i.e. all the elements of the budget constraint. This implies that, by definition, for
each country i at time t the following holds:
n∑
j=1
Fjit = 0 (11)
where j denotes the number of the fiscal instruments available. Therefore, in order to avoid
multicollinearity, at least one of the fiscal instruments must be excluded from the specification
so that equation (9) becomes:






(γj − γn)Fk,it + λ′ift + εit (12)
4Moreover, heterogeneous time effects (δiτt) can also be included in the model to capture any remaining
time-varying heterogeneity. We report that the latter does not alter our key results.
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The omitted fiscal instrument(s) effectively assumes the role of the implicit financing vari-
able(s), that is, the variable that adjusts so that the government budget constraint is satisfied
for every t.
Based on equation (12) an intuitive interpretation of the point estimates of the fiscal
instruments implies that the coefficients γk represent the growth effects of a unit change in
the fiscal instrument Fk,it, offset by a unit change in the omitted variable Fn,it, which assumes
the role of the implicit financing instrument. As expected the estimated coefficient of each
fiscal instrument depends on how it is financed. Thus the implicit financing instruments
should be those that have a zero effect on long-run GDP growth according to the theoretical
model, i.e. nondistortionary taxation and/or unproductive government expenditures. We
report that the impact of these categories on long-run growth is indeed zero in our sample,
i.e.γn = 0 - see Table A4 in the Appendix.
2.4 Addressing Endogeneity
In our setup, endogeneity may arise via two potential channels, namely because of unob-
served common factors and reverse causality. Starting with the first channel, the unobserved
common factors may be correlated with the observed explanatory variables leading to an om-
mitted variables bias (see equations (6) and (7) in section 2). This type of endogeneity bias
has not yet been addressed in the relevant empirical literature. Employing the CCE approach
this can be directly dealt with via the augmentation of the model with cross-sectional means
that account for the presence of the unobservables.
Our aim is to identify the effects of changes in the fiscal variables on growth; however,
reverse causality implies that growth rates can also induce changes in the fiscal variables
(e.g. via Wagner’s law). Most studies have attempted to deal with reverse causality either
by using instrumental variable approaches (however as Gemmell et al. (2011) show the task
of finding a suitable instrument is difficult) or by estimating the proposed models using
the GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that rely
on own-instrumentation. It should be noted that the GMM estimators were designed for
panels with a small time and a large cross section dimension. The latter condition is not
satisfied in our context. In the case of large time dimension panels, the instrument count
may become quite large casting doubts on their validity (see Roodman (2009)). Moreover,
the standard GMM estimators are not valid in the presence of cross-sectional dependence
and non-stationarity in the panel - see Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Eberhardt and Teal
(2019). To this end, we follow the approach of Canning and Pedroni (2008) and use weak
exogeneity tests in order to determine the direction of causal impact between different sets
of variables. We present this approach in more detail in section A.6 of the Appendix.
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3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data and Data Properties
We test the predictions of the standard endogenous growth model in a sample of 27 European
Union countries during the 1995-2017 period.5 All the data used in the empirical analysis
are obtained from Eurostat.
We focus on this time period in order to ensure that our dataset is consistent across
time and countries, without the need for merging and/or imputing data. Most studies, e.g.
Gemmell et al. (2011) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), compile datasets that
have been constructed under different methodological assumptions of the national accounts
in order to increase the time dimension of their sample.6 As such, by using Eurostat data
we are able to compute measures of productive/unproductive expenditures on the basis of
harmonized general government data.
In addition, other studies (e.g. Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), Angelopoulos
et al. (2007), ten Kate and Milionis (2019)) opt for the use of period averaged data (e.g. 5-
year averages) in order to account for the distortions caused by cyclical fluctuations however
we use annual data. The common factor representation is uniquely suited to account for the
impact of the business cycle because can account for both large global shocks -i.e. ‘strong’
factors- and for more localized spillover effects -i.e. ‘weak’ factors (for more on this issue
see Eberhardt and Teal (2013)).
In order to construct the productive and unproductive government expenditure categories,
we follow Kneller et al. (1999) and utilize the functional classification of government expen-
ditures (i.e. COFOG). Tax revenue data are classified as distortionary and nondistortionary
following the classification provided by Eurostat in terms of direct and indirect taxes (see the
Commission (2019) taxation trends report). The set of conditioning variables includes the
growth rate of the labour force and a proxy for the investment rate. In particular, we use a
measure of investment (defined as the Gross Fixed Capital Formation minus the Dwellings
and Transports) that more closely resembles private business investment.7 Table 1 contains
5Croatia is excluded due to lack of sufficient observations. In some of the specifications, the panel is
unbalanced due to the lack of some sectoral accounts data for a limited number of countries (namely Spain,
Slovenia and Malta).
6In particular, a number of papers, e.g. Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) and Gemmell et al.
(2011), combine different vintages of IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database in order to be
able to compute productive and unproductive expenditure indicators. However, the relevant data contained
in the older GFS vintages were reported on a cash rather than on an accrual basis and referred to the
central rather than the general government level. Moreover, there was a significant methodological change
introduced with the GFS 2001 manual related to the functional classification of government expenditures
and, in particular, an increase of the relevant categories from 10 to 14, which affects the classification of
expenditures into productive and unproductive. This implies that all the data series used in these papers are
in essence a combination of data produced under different methodological approaches.
7Gemmell et al. (2011) use a similar proxy, namely Private Non-Residential Investment rather than Gross
Fixed Capital Formation
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the theoretical classification of the fiscal instruments and Table 2 contains key descriptive
statistics.
Tables 1 and 2 here
Before proceeding with the regression analysis, we carry out some statistical tests in
order to investigate the cross-section dependence and time series properties of our sample.
In particular, we first apply the weak cross-section dependence test of Pesaran (2015) to all
the variables used in the empirical model. Intuitively, weak cross-sectional dependence means
that the correlation between units at each point in time converges to zero as the number of
cross-sections goes to infinity whereas, under strong dependence this correlation converges
to a constant. The results presented in Table A2 of the Appendix indicate that all variables
are subject to strong cross-sectional dependencies. Moreover, in order to test for the order
of integration of the variables we utilize the CIPS test of Pesaran (2007) which specifically
addresses the existence of cross-sectional dependence. In particular, the test is an extension
of the well known IPS test introduced in Im et al. (2003), with the main difference being
that the group-specific regressions are augmented with cross-sectional averages to capture
any dependencies. As in the IPS test, the null hypothesis states that all individual series
are non-stationary while under the alternative only a fraction of the series is stationary. The
relevant results, presented in Table A3, indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
non-stationarity. Thus, we treat all variables as being I(1).
3.2 Main results
Table 3 summarizes our main results when the set of fiscal instruments includes the budget
deficit,8 productive expenditures and distortionary taxation, while the set of conditioning
variables includes labour force growth and our proxy for the investment rate. Our focus is
on the estimates of the CCEP model in column [4] which by construction can account for
the impact of large macroeconomic shocks and structural breaks; while the diagnostic tests
for this model are favourable and indicate the existence of a long-run relationship between
fiscal policy instruments and long run growth rate. For comparison purposes, Table 3 also
presents estimates from empirical models that have been widely used in the related literature,
namely Pooled OLS (POLS), the two-way Fixed Effects (FE) and the First Difference (FD)
estimators respectively.
Table 3 here
Overall, the empirical results of Table 3 provide strong support to the predictions of
the standard endogenous growth model; namely, fiscal policy matters for growth and exerts
8Defined, following Eurostat, as the difference between general government revenue and general govern-
ment expenditure, resulting in either net lending(+)/surplus or net borrowing(-)/deficit.
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long-run persistent effects. Perhaps more importantly, when we apply the CCEP estima-
tion method our results differentiate from the relevant literature. Specifically we document
stronger effects of fiscal policy on growth. As we illustrate below, this could be attributed to
the fact that the CCEP estimator accounts for both the heterogeneous effects of unobserved
common factors and potential non-stationarity.
The CCEP estimator show a clear cut effect of the various fiscal variables on growth.
Increases in productive government expenditures enhances growth while increases in distor-
tionary taxation is harmful for growth in EU countries. The CCEP coefficients are significantly
larger with respect to the associated coefficients estimated with the other models (see below).
In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in productive government expenditures, financed
by an adjustment of unproductive expenditures and/or non-distortionary taxation, leads to
a permanent increase in the growth rate by almost 0.39 percentage points. In contrast, a 1
percentage point increase in distortionary taxation causes a permanent decrease of growth
rates by 0.7 percentage points. Thus, the relatively larger negative effects from increases
in distortionary taxation eventually lead to a negative net effect of fiscal policy on long run
growth. This is in contrast to the neutral effects identified in Gemmell et al. (2011).
Moreover, the positive coefficient of the budget deficit variable indicates that a 1 percent-
age point increase in budget deficits leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the growth
rate. The economic logic implies that budget deficits which finance productive government
spending and/or cuts in distortionary taxes boost growth.9 The coefficients of the condition-
ing variables imply that the impact of labour force growth is statistically insignificant, while
as expected investment induces a strong positive effect on the growth rate. The diagnostic
tests -depicted in the lower panel of Table 3- indicate that the residuals of the CCEP model
are stationary. We interpret this as an ad hoc test that verifies the presence of a long-run and
cointegrating relationship. Moreover, the residuals are weakly cross-sectionally dependent.
Results from the POLS model indicate a significantly smaller impact of fiscal policy on
growth while the coefficient on government expenditures is not statistically significant (see
column [1]). In this case the residuals are non-stationary, thus, the possibility of spurious
results cannot be excluded. The FE model, which assumes an homogeneous impact of the
unobserved common factors, produces results qualitatively similar with the CCEP model.
However, the magnitude of these coefficients is significantly smaller (see column [2]). These
results indicate that ignoring the heterogeneous impact of unobserved factors across countries
could lead to significant underestimation of the fiscal policy effects on growth. In the FD
model productive expenditures are statistically insignificant, while distortionary taxation has
a larger in magnitude negative impact compared to the FE case (and close to the CCEP one
see column [3]). Given that the FD is by construction unaffected by nonstationarity –unlike
the FE– this result highlights the importance of accounting for the time series properties
of the data. However, the results of the FD model cannot be interpreted as representing
9This result is in line with the one obtained by Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001) and Gemmell
et al. (2011) - we refer to their paper for additional details.
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long-run effects; rather, the FD model may capture short-run effects.
The preceding analysis has dealt with the issue of endogeneity arising from the presence of
the unobserved common factors. However, as already mentioned in section 2.4, endogeneity
may arise due to reverse causality. In order to examine whether the empirical results are driven
by reverse causality we implemented weak exogeneity tests, presented in section A.6 of the
Appendix. We report that results from the CCEP model can be interpreted as representing
a causal relationship running from the fiscal variables to the growth rates and not vice-versa.
3.3 Impact of unobserved common factors during the Global Financial Crisis
Our baseline results indicate that the estimates obtained from the CCEP model point to
significantly larger output effects of fiscal policy, when compared to the estimates obtained
from the POLS, FE and FD models. This is potentially due to the fact that the CCEP
estimator can account for the heterogeneous impact of unobserved common shocks and
non-stationarity. Examples of such shocks in our sample are the Global Financial Crisis of
2008 and the ensuing European debt crisis. In this section we illustrate the importance of
accounting for these unobserved shocks by quantifying their average impact over time. To do
so, we follow Bond and Eberhardt (2013) and Eberhardt and Teal (2019) and compute what
they term as ‘common dynamic process’. More specifically, the common dynamic process is
an approximation of the average impact of the unobserved common factors and is computed
from the coefficient of the T − 1 differenced time dummies of the FD model. The results
are depicted in Figure 1. As can be gleaned from the figure, for the period up to 2007
the average impact of the common factors is quite small. However, in 2008 we observe a
significant negative effect associated with the Global Financial Crisis, which persisted up to
2012; afterwards, the effect has remained negative but its magnitude is significantly smaller.
In order to further assess the impact of the unobserved strong common factors, we
estimate the FE model in two subsamples: one for the period up to 2007, and one for the
2007-2017 period so as to isolate the impact of the crisis. The results for the pre-crisis
sample indicate that productive expenditures and distortionary taxation have coefficients of
opposite sign and almost identical in magnitude (0.41 and -0.42 respectively)10, pointing
to an overall neutral effect. On the contrary, in the post-crisis sample the coefficient of
distortionary taxation remains significant and is now large in magnitude, while productive
expenditures are now negative and insignificant. This result highlights the importance of
accounting for large global shocks when estimating the impact of fiscal policy changes on
growth to avoid misspecification.11
10Results are available upon request.
11It should be noted here that due to the relatively small time dimension of the sample, a similar analysis
for the CCEP model cannot be conducted.
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4 Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of our results to the following changes in the empirical
model and the sample: firstly, we estimate a version of the main model that augments the set
of control variables with trade openness. Secondly, we omit from the sample the countries
of the European periphery (i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Our reasoning is that
these countries could be considered as outliers given that they exhibited a significant degree
of variation both in GDP growth and in the fiscal variables during the period examined.
Finally, we assess the impact of changes in the fiscal policy mix, that is, in the composition
of government expenditures and the tax structure. To obtain a better insight into the effects
of changes in the various tax categories we employ estimates of aggregate effective tax rates
(ETR) on labour and capital income and on consumption.
4.1 Including Trade Openness
In most of the cross-country analyses of the output effects of fiscal policy, a number of time-
varying factors are included in the model as additional control variables in order to account for
country-specific growth characteristics.12 Arin et al. (2019) using Bayesian Model Averaging
examine which of the abovementioned variables are robust growth determinants and their
evidence suggests that only trade openness appears to have a significant and robust impact
on growth. Given that their sample is quite similar to ours, both in terms of countries covered
and the time period, we opt to augment our model with trade openness. Results are presented
in Table 4. Openness appears to be positively related to long-run growth while the coefficient
of productive expenditures remains positive but it is now statistically insignificant. This result
is consistent with the literature that examines the relationship between government size and
openness. In general, more open economies tend to have larger governments in order to
mitigate the larger external risks they are faced with (e.g. see Rodrik (1998)). However, the
overall effect of fiscal policy changes remains negative, due to the large negative impact of
distortionary taxation.
Table 4 here
4.2 Excluding the Periphery Countries
Following the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis, the countries of the so called Periphery–
namely, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain– implemented fiscal adjustment programmes
which resulted in significant shifts in the expenditure and tax policy mix. In order to assess
the impact of such abrupt fiscal changes on our results, we exclude these countries from the
12This set of variables stems from the literature of growth determinants (see Durlauf et al. (2008) and
Sala-I-Martin et al. (2004)) and includes trade openness, inflation, fertility rates, human capital proxies and
indices of institutional quality (see, among others, Afonso and Jalles (2016), Angelopoulos et al. (2007), Lee
and Gordon (2005), Mendoza et al. (1997) and Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008)).
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sample. Results presented in Table 5 are in line with those in Table 3. For example, the effect
of distortionary taxation remains significantly large and negative while at the same time the
positive effect of productive expenditures on growth is relatively larger in magnitude across
all estimators (with the exception of POLS). It is worth noticing that under the CCEP model
(see column [4] of the Table), which is our preferred specification, the impact of productive
expenditures is almost double in magnitude compared to the baseline case. We attribute this
result to the fact that in some Periphery countries, the policy mix was less favourable for
growth. Post 2008 these countries, mainly due to the fiscal consolidation which occurred,
have increased distortionary vis-a-vis nondistortionary taxes while have decreased productive
expenditures vis-a-vis unproductive.
Table 5 here
4.3 Changes in the Policy Mix
The empirical estimates presented thus far indicate that changes in the size of produc-
tive expenditures and/or distortionary taxation, financed by equal and offsetting changes in
unproductive expenditures and non-distortionary taxation, have significant long-run output
effects.
In this section we assess the impact of changes in the fiscal policy mix, that is, the
composition of government expenditures (using as a proxy the share of productive over total
government expenditures) and the tax structure (proxied by the share of distortionary in total
tax revenues). Further, we explore in more detail the impact of changes in the tax structure
by using estimates of aggregate Effective Tax Rates (henceforth, ETRs). Effective tax rates
have the advantage of directly corresponding to the tax categories used in most theoretical
models and will allow us to assess whether shifting the burden away from a distortionary tax
(e.g. labour or capital) toward a less distortionary category (consumption) has a positive
output effect. Moreover, they can better approximate the complexity of each country’s
tax system, while also providing measures suitable for international comparisons. Section
A.5 of the Technical Appendix provides a brief description of the methodology used for the
computation of the indicators along with some descriptive statistics.13
Table 6 here
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that an increase in the share of productive gov-
ernment expenditures is associated with positive and significant effects on long-run growth,
irrespective of the changes in the tax structure. Moreover, shifts away from capital income
taxation are associated with positive growth effects, especially in the case where the tax bur-
den is shifted toward consumption, indicating that -for this sample- capital taxation is the
most harmful policy option for growth. Overall, we conclude that a shift in the expenditure
13Kostarakos and Varthalitis (2019) compute ETRs over the 1995-2017 period for EU countries.
13
mix toward a larger share of productive expenditures combined with a shift away from more
distortionary tax categories toward taxes on consumption has a significant positive effect on
long-run growth rates.
5 Conclusion and Possible Extensions
This paper reassesses the predictions of the standard endogenous growth models regarding
the long-run output effects of changes in fiscal policy. We apply an estimation approach,
which accounts for the heterogeneous impact of global macroeconomic shocks, on a panel
of EU countries.
The main results lend strong support to the predictions of the endogenous growth model
and indicate that when the impact of large shocks is not accounted for, the effects of fiscal
policy on growth are underestimated.
Here we discuss potential extensions. Our analysis focuses on the impact of changes
in the composition of the fiscal structure –i.e. the policy mix– taking the efficiency of the
public sector as given. However, the quality of public administration plays a central role in
efficiently allocating resources towards more productive expenditures, which could lead to
higher growth rates in the long-run. Exploring the policy mix-efficiency nexus will provide
further insight into the mechanisms via which fiscal policy affects output.
Another interesting extension would be the analysis of the long-run distributional impact
of fiscal policy and, in particular, whether the policy mix that emerges as growth-enhancing
is sufficient to mitigate the effects of macroeconomic shocks on income inequality.
Finally, it would also be interesting to assess the impact of expenditure- and/or tax-neutral
changes in fiscal policy, utilizing disaggregated data on the relevant fiscal instruments (e.g.
expenditures in education and health, taxes on personal and corporate income etc.). We
leave these extensions for future work.
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6 Tables and Figures
6.1 Data
6.1.1 Classification of Variables
Table 1: Classification of Variables
Theoretical Classification National Accounts Classification
Nondistortionary Taxation Taxes on Production and Imports
Distortionary
Taxation












Public Order and Safety
Economic Affairs
Recreation, Culture and Religion
Social Protection
Note: The classification of expenditures is based on Kneller et al. (1999) and Gemmell
et al. (2011), while the classification of tax categories follows the European Commission
definition (see the ”Taxation Trend in the EU” annual report)
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6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min (country) Max (country) Observations
Real GDP p.c growth (% p.a.) 2.46 3.66 -16.65 (Bulgaria) 24.05 (Ireland) 621
Investment Rate 15.61 3.67 3.86 (Bulgaria) 31.09 (Slovakia) 621
Labour Force Growth (% p.a.) 0.49 1.49 -8.83 (Romania) 6.84 (Luxembourg) 621
Productive Expenditures 19.98 3.23 12.58 (Ireland) 29.46 (Lithuania) 621
Unproductive Expenditures 23.97 4.45 11.89 (Bulgaria) 45.29 (Ireland) 621
Distortionary Taxation 22.71 5.16 10.86 (Portugal) 34.57 (Belgium) 621
Nonistortionary Taxation 13.43 2.58 8.39 (Ireland) 24.29 (Sweden) 621
Budget Deficit/Surplus -2.69 4.17 -31.79 (Ireland) 7.79 (Luxembourg) 621
Consumption ETR (%) 18.49 3.62 8.976 (Spain) 64.8 (Luxembourg) 591
Labour ETR (%) 39.6 9.86 8.96 (Cyprus) 64.8 (Denmark) 593
Capital ETR (%) 18.22 8.83 4.63 (Lithuania) 51.4 (Sweden) 593
Corporate ETR (%) 19.49 9.23 2.28 (Lithuania) 65.2 (Poland) 584
Note: All variables are shares of GDP, unless otherwise specified. All National Accounts and are from Eurostat
and, in particular, the Main GDP Aggregates per capita series [nama 10 pc], the GDP and Main Components
(Output, Expenditure and Income) series [nama 10 gdp] and the Gross Fixed Capital Formation by Asset Type
series [nama 10 an6]. The expenditures data are from the Government Expenditure, Revenue and Aggregates series
[gov 10a main] and the General Government Expenditure by Function series [gov 10a exp], while the revenue data





Table 3: Baseline Results
POLS FE FD CCEP
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Investment 0.244∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.103 0.389∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.616) (0.025)
Labour Force 0.0937 0.150 0.09 0.112
(0.350) (0.235) (0.275) (0.303)
Budget 0.130∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.061 0.201∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.108) (0.004)
Productive exp. −0.0295 0.192 0.125 0.368∗
(0.672) (0.180) (0.725) (0.095)
Distortionary tax. −0.170∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.539∗∗∗ −0.595∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
CD −0.171 0.506 0.398 −0.257
CD (p-val) 0.864 0.613 0.691 0.798
CIPS −0.590 −0.292 −6.249 −7.531
CIPS (p-val) 0.278 0.385 0.001 0.000
Observations 617 617 590 617
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: FE - Fixed Effects estimator with time dummies, CCEP - Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator.
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
CD Test: Pesaran (2015) test for the null of weak cross-sectional dependence of the residuals. Results obtained
using the user-written Stata routines xtcd by Eberhardt (2011) and xtcd2 by Ditzen (2018)
CIPS: Pesaran (2007) test for the null hypothesis of non-stationary residuals The results reported are based on
two lags (full results available upon request) and were obtained using the multipurt user-written Stata routine by
M. Eberhardt.
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Figure 1: The Evolution of the Average Impact of Common Factors
Note: Derived from column 3 of Table 3
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6.2.3 Including Trade Openness
Table 4: Effects of Trade Openness
POLS FE FD CCEP
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Investment 0.244∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.091 0.434∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.659) (0.000)
Labour Force 0.0649 0.117 0.089 0.126
(0.557) (0.331) (0.288) (0.256)
Budget 0.127∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.051 0.179∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.132) (0.024)
Productive Exp. −0.0124 0.194 0.107 0.341
(0.862) (0.162) (0.753) (0.180)
Distortionary Tax. −0.171∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.511 −0.582∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.115) (0.01)
Trade Openness 0.0025 0.0231 0.043 0.0774∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.130) (0.11) (0.007)
CD −0.149 −0.565 0.388 −0.399
CD (p-val) 0.882 0.572 0.698 0.690
CIPS −0.668 −0.340 −5.545 −7.764
CIPS (p-val) 0.252 0.367 0.003 0.000
Observations 617 617 590 617
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6.2.4 Excluding Periphery Countries
Table 5: Baseline Results excluding Periphery Countries
POLS FE FD CCEP
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Investment 0.257∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.241 0.317∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.194) (0.057)
Labour Force 0.0815 0.216 0.098 0.134
(0.455) (0.167) (0.224) (0.239)
Budget 0.123∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.202∗∗
(0.021) (0.000) (0.087) (0.04)
Productive Exp. −0.0117 0.2486 0.329 0.474∗∗
(0.874) (0.143) (0.333) (0.041)
Distortionary tax. −0.159∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗ −0.859∗∗ −0.532∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.02) (0.034) (0.002)
Observations 525 525 502 525
CD −0.035 −0.454 −0.092 1.019
CD (p-val) 0.972 0.650 0.927 0.308
CIPS −1.009 −1.212 −6.313 −4.495
CIPS (p-val) 0.156 0.113 0.000 0.000
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6.2.5 Changes in the Fiscal Policy Mix
Table 6: Changes in the Fiscal Policy Mix
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment 0.491∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗
(0.001) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
Labour Force 0.104 0.151 0.164 0.0939
(0.36) (0.135) (0.150) (0.436)
Budget 0.0838 0.0906 0.087 0.111
(0.299) (0.274) (0.286) (0.160)
Productive share 0.241∗ 0.227∗ 0.254∗ 0.192∗∗














Observations 594 587 587 589
CD 0.177 0.356 0.525 0.541
CD (p-val) 0.859 0.722 0.600 0.588
CIPS −6.236 −5.796 −5.072 −4.899
CIPS (p-val) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Malta is excluded due to lack of data on Effective Tax Rates
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A.2 Cross-Sectional Dependence Tests
Table A2: Cross-Sectional Dependence Properties of the Variables I
Panel A: Levels Panel B: First Difference
g n I g n I
ρ̂ 0.543 0.054 0.206 ρ̂ 0.57 0.03 0.19
ˆ|ρ| 0.547 0.213 0.353 ˆ|ρ| 0.57 0.24 0.25
CD 61.58 14.553 88.523 CD 49.75 2.289 9.867
CD(p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000 CD(p-val) 0.000 0.022 0.000
Panel C: AR(2) Panel D: AR(2) CCE
g n I g n I
ρ̂ 0.551 0.04 0.181 ρ̂ 0.013 -0.03 -0.006
ˆ|ρ| 0.555 0.211 0.247 ˆ|ρ| 0.248 0.237 0.223
CD 47.34 3.46 15.56 CD 1.14 -2.24 -0.55
CD(p-val) 0.000 0.001 0.000 CD(p-val) 0.254 0.025 0.582
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Table A2 (cont’d): Cross-Sectional Dependence Properties of the Variables II
Panel A: Levels Panel B: First Difference
Budget Productive Distortionary Budget Productive Distortionary
ρ̂ 0.259 0.203 0.037 ρ̂ 0.11 0.25 0.06
ˆ|ρ| 0.291 0.394 0.366 ˆ|ρ| 0.20 0.31 0.19
CD 38.655 88.715 89.437 CD 9.867 21.731 4.935
CD(p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000 CD(p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: AR(2) Panel D: AR(2) CCE
Budget Productive Distortionary Budget Productive Distortionary
ρ̂ 0.177 0.237 0.035 ρ̂ -0.029 0.029 0.035
ˆ|ρ| 0.229 0.292 0.198 ˆ|ρ| 0.211 0.245 0.216
CD 15.22 20.38 3.05 CD -2.52 1.658 -1.758
CD(p-val) 0.000 0.000 0.002 CD(p-val) 0.012 0.097 0.079
Note: We present the average (ρ̂) and average absolute correlation coefficients ˆ|ρ| for GDP per
capital growth (g), labour force growth (n) and the rate of investment (I). CD reports the Pesaran
(2015) weak cross-section dependence statistic, which is distributed N(0,1) under the null of weak
cross-section dependence. Panels A and B test the variable series in levels and first differences
respectively. In Panel C each of the variables in levels is entered into a time-series regression
zit = a0i + a1izi,t−1 + a2izi,t−2 + a3it + εit, conducted separately for each country i. In Panel D
the country-specific regressions are augmented with cross-sectional averages of all variables instead
of a linear trend. The correlations and cross-section dependence statistics in Panels C and D are
then based on the residuals from these AR(2) regressions. We used the Stata routine xtcd2 written
by Ditzen (2018).
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A.3 Panel Unit Root Tests
Table A3: Pesaran (2007) CIPS test
GDP growth Lab. Force Inv. Budget
lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val.
0 -3.684 0.000 0 -12.196 0.000 0 -0.707 0.240 0 -8.631 0.000
1 -1.975 0.024 1 -5.575 0.000 1 0.114 0.545 1 -8.399 0.000
2 -0.092 0.463 2 -0.640 0.261 2 2.723 0.997 2 -2.379 0.009
3 1.403 0.920 3 2.474 0.993 3 4.966 1.000 3 0.136 0.554
Productive Distortionary Unprodutive Nondistortionary
lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val.
0 -0.859 0.195 0 -0.104 0.459 0 -3.755 0.000 0 2.048 0.980
1 -0.766 0.222 1 0.065 0.747 1 -1.852 0.032 1 3.060 0.999
2 -0.471 0.681 2 3.199 0.999 2 -0.905 0.183 2 2.761 0.997
3 -2.445 0.007 3 3.197 1.000 3 -0.129 0.443 3 5.407 1.000
τ l τk τ c τ corp
lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val. lags Z[t-bar] p-val.
0 -0.739 0.230 0 -0.289 0.386 0 0.473 0.682 0 -3.128 0.001
1 -0.426 0.335 1 1.880 0.970 2 1.797 0.964 2 0.010 0.504
2 2.909 0.998 2 3.500 1.000 2 3.903 1.000 2 1.263 0.897
3 2.895 0.998 3 5.179 1.000 3 6.022 1.000 3 2.412 0.997
Note: The null hypothesis of the CIPS test is that of non-stationarity
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A.4 Testing for the Growth-Neutral Elements of the Budget
Table A4: Estimations based on the CCEP model
[1] [2] [3]
Investment 0.501∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labour Force 0.0871 0.0871 0.127
(0.325) (0.325) (0.200)
Budget 0.254∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.050) (0.000)
Productive exp. 0.482 0.353∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.078) (0.003)






Observations 617 617 617
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: In order to test whether nondistortionary taxation and unproductive expenditures have
the expected from theory neutral-growth effects, we follow the approach outlined in section 3.2.
As can be seen in columns [1] and [2], both instruments have coefficients equal in magnitude
and insignificant. Also note that, because of the government budget constraint, the coefficients
of the conditioning variables do not change in columns [1] and [2].
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A.5 Effective Tax Rates
Effective tax rates are aggregate tax measures which essentially classify all forms of tax
receipts into revenues from labour, capital and consumption. As such, they closely correspond
to the tax rates used in most theoretical dynamic macroeconomic models and essentially
represent the wedge distorting the optimizing behaviour of economic agents. The main
advantages of using effective tax rates are the following: first, they are relatively easy to
compute using readily available data from the National Accounts and Revenue Statistics and
since they exploit the consistency of the National Accounts, they are suitable for international
comparisons. Moreover, they separate the tax on labour income from the tax on capital
income, a distinction not available in the Revenue Statistics series, and which allows for
better comparability with tax rates in theoretical macro models. Finally, given that the
effective tax rate estimates are computed using the actual, realized amounts collected from
each tax category, they incorporate the net combined effect of tax credits, exemptions and
deduction of each country’s tax system. On the other hand, the main disadvantage of the
effective tax rates is that they do not take into account the information regarding statutory
tax rates and the income distribution per tax bracket.
In Kostarakos and Varthalitis (2019)14, following Carey and Rabesona (2002) and Dellas
et al. (2017), we compute ETRs for all the EU member states over the 1995-2017 period,
using data from Eurostat and, in particular, data from the Annual National Accounts Series
(nama 10 gdp), the Non-Financial Annual Sector Accounts (nasa 10 nf tr) and the Tax
Aggregates of Annual Government Finance Statistics (gov 10a taxag). All the relevant data,
along with their accompanying ESA 2010 codes are presented in Table A5.




A well-documented problem related to the computation of effective tax rates on labour
and capital income is that tax revenue sources do not provide a breakdown of personal income
tax into its labour and capital components. To address this issue, we follow Mendoza et al.
(1994) and assume that both the labour and capital income of households are taxed at the
same rate, τh. The effective tax rate on household income is given by:
τh =
D51A C1
(D1−D611−D613) + (BA43Ghh − P51Chh) + (D41rhh −D41phh))




14The database with the estimates of the effective tax rates is avaialble at https://sites.google.com/
site/ikostarakos/effective-tax-rates
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Table A5: Data used for ETR computation
Tax Revenue National Accounts
ESA Code Definition ESA Code Definition
D2 Taxes on Production and Imports B2A3Ghh GOS of Households
D214B Stamp Taxes B2A3Gnfc GOS of NFC
D214C Taxes on Financial and Capital Transactions B2A3Gfc GOS of FC
D214F Taxes on Lotteries, Gambling etc. B2A3Gtotal GOS of Total Economy
D29 Other Taxes on Production D2 Compensation of Employees
D29H Other Taxes on Production n.e.c. D41Phh Interest Income Paid HH
D59A Current Taxes on Capital D41Rhh Interest Income Received HH
D51nfc Taxes on Income NFC D611 Employers’ Actual SSC
D51fc Taxes on Income FC D613 Household Actual SSC
D51A C1 Taxes on Individual or Household Income P2 Government Intermediate C
D51B C2 Taxes on the Income and Profits of Corp. P3 Household FCE
D91 Capital Taxes P51C Consumption of Fixed Capital
Note: Data are from Eurostat National Accounts and Tax Revenue Database (see Appendix A.5).
while the effective tax rate on capital income is given by:
τk =
τh(B2A3Ghh − P51Chh +D41rhh −D41phh) + CAPT
B2A3Gtotal − P51Ctotal
where CAPT = D214B + D214C + D29 + D29H + D51B C2 + D51D + D59 + D91






A.6 Direction of Causation
As already stated, the Common Correlated Effects approach is uniquely suited to address
concerns related to endogeneity arising from the presence of unobserved common factors,
which may drive both the observable inputs (i.e. the fiscal and the conditioning variables)
and GDP per capita growth.
However, this approach is not immune to reverse causality, a concern that has been a
central point in the empirical fiscal policy and growth literature. As indicated above, the
standard approach utilized in the literature in an attempt to tackle reverse causality has been
the use of instrumental variable approaches. In particular, most studies employ GMM-type
estimators (Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998)) which have the advantage
of relying on own-instrumentation. However, as noted in Eberhardt and Teal (2019), these
estimators assume stationarity and cross-section dependence. If any of these assumptions is
violated, as is the case in our sample, then this instrumentation strategy is invalid.
In order to determine the direction of causation between the various sets of variables, we
follow the approach of Canning and Pedroni (2008), which has also been used by Eberhardt
and Presbitero (2015) and Eberhardt and Teal (2019).
In particular, given that a cointegrating relationship exists among the variables, as indi-
cated by the stationary residuals, then by the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and
Granger (1987)) we know that the cointegrated series can be represented as dynamic error
correction models. In this case, these take the following form:






























where ûit = yit− β̂xit− γ̂Fit is the disequilibrium term. For a long-run relationship to exist,
at least one of the λ’s must be different from zero; in particular, if λ11 6= 0 then xit, Fit have
a causal impact on yit (which can be denoted as xit, Fit → yit). If λ12, λ13 are different
from zero as well, then all variables are simultaneously determined and no causal relationship
can be identified.
We performed the weak exogeneity test for the FE as well as the CCEP specification,
which is the preferred one based on the diagnostic tests. In line with the Pesaran (2006)
approach, the error correction models were augmented with cross-section averages of both
the dependent and independent variables, including their lags15. The relevant results are
15I only included one and two lags of the cross-sectional averages, due to the limited time dimension of the
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presented in Table A6. The error-correction models were estimated at the country level and
the null hypothesis is that of no causal impact (λji 6= 0).
Starting with the results of the Fixed Effects model, we observe that the null of no causal
impact cannot be rejected for the GDP growth equation, while the null is rejected for the
budget and productive expenditure equations, implying that these variables are caused by
GDP growth. Our interpretation of these results is that the misspecified Fixed Effects model
has led to non-stationary residuals, such that there is no long-run cointegrating relationship.
Turning to the results from the CCEP model, in the lower panel of Table A6, the null of
no causal impact is rejected for the GDP growth equation, indicating that there is a long-run
causal relation from the fiscal and conditioning variables to growth. The null of no causal
impact cannot be rejected in the case of the budget, productive expenditure and distortionary
taxation equations.
Overall, the weak exogeneity tests indicate that the empirical results based on the CCEP
model can be interpreted as representing uni-directoral relationships from the fiscal (and
conditioning) variables to GDP growth and not vice versa; as such, the results seem to not
be driven by reverse causality.
Table A6: Canning and Pedroni (2008) tests for direction of causation
Model
Variable
GDP growth Labour force growth Investment Budget Productive Distortionary
FE
Avg λ -0.352 0.146 0.625 0.361 0.297 -0.124
p-val. 0.152 0.31 0.02* 0.019* 0.042* 0.75
CCEP
Avg λ -0.88 -0.119 0.174 0.276 -0.015 -0.064
p-val. 0.000* 0.539 0.027* 0.235 0.749 0.351
Note: FE - Fixed Effects estimator with time dummies, CCEP - Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator.
Avg λ denotes the robust mean coefficient for the disequilibrium error term on the ECM.
The null hypothesis is that of no causal impact (λi = 0). An asterisk indicates the cases for which the null is rejected
sample. I present the results for the one-lag augmentation only and report that the inclusion of the second
lag does not alter the results qualitatively
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